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As theNorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization cele-
brates its 60th birthday, there are mounting signs
of troublewithin the alliance and reasons todoubt
the organization’s relevance regarding the foreign
policy challenges of the 21st century. Several devel-
opments contribute to those doubts.
Although NATO has added numerous new
members during the past decade, most of them
possess minuscule military capabilities. Some of
them also have murky political systems and con-
tentious relations with neighboring states,
including (and most troubling) a nuclear-armed
Russia. Thus, NATO’s new members are weak,
vulnerable, and provocative—an especially dan-
gerous combination for the United States in its
role as NATO’s leader.
There are also growing fissures in the alliance
about how to deal with Russia. The older, West
European powers tend to favor a cautious, concil-
iatory policy, whereas the Central and East Euro-
pean countries advocate a more confrontational,
hard-line approach. TheUnited States is caught in
themiddle of that intra-alliance squabble.
Perhapsmostworrisome, thedefense spending
levels and military capabilities of NATO’s princi-
pal European members have plunged in recent
years. The decay of those military forces has
reached the point that American leaders nowwor-
ry that joint operations with U.S. forces are
becoming difficult, if not impossible. The ineffec-
tiveness of the European militaries is apparent in
NATO’s stumbling performance in Afghanistan.
NATO has outlived whatever usefulness it had.
Superficially, it remains an impressive institution,
but it has become a hollow shell—farmore a politi-
cal honor society than a meaningful security orga-
nization. Yet, while the alliance exists, it is a vehicle
for European countries to free ride on theU.S.mil-
itary commitment instead of spending adequately
on their own defenses and taking responsibility for
the security of their own region. American calls for
greater burden-sharing are even more futile today
than theyhavebeenover thepast60years.Until the
United States changes the incentives by withdraw-
ing its troops from Europe and phasing out its
NATO commitment, the Europeans will happily
continue to evade their responsibilities.
Today’s NATO is a bad bargain for the United
States. We have security obligations to countries
that add little to our own military power. Even
worse, some of those countries could easily entan-
gle America in dangerous parochial disputes. It is
time to terminate this increasingly dysfunctional
alliance.
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Introduction
NATO celebrates its 60th birthday on
April 4. There will be much celebration, not
only about the alliance’s longevity and past
successes, but about its goals in the coming
decades. The view that the alliance is both
healthy and an essential political and securi-
ty player in the 21st century is reinforced by
the apparent attitude of the new government
of NATO’s leading power, the United States.
The administration of George W. Bush often
seemed to prefer a unilateral approach to for-
eign affairs, and U.S. leaders occasionally
exhibited disdain for some of Washington’s
European allies—recall Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld’s derisive reference to “old
Europe” to describe Germany, France, and
other West European countries that were
critical of U.S. policy on Iraq.1
Conversely, President Barack Obama’s for-
eign policy team has repeatedly emphasized its
commitment to multilateralism in general and
NATO in particular. During her confirmation
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
stressed thatWashington’spolicy shouldbeone
of “smart power.” Amongother aspectsClinton
explained, smart power “means strengthening
the alliances that have stood the test of time,
especially with our NATO partners and our
allies in East Asia.”2
The professed optimism on both sides of
the Atlantic, though, cannot conceal growing
doubts about NATO’s relevance to the policy
challenges of the 21st century, and, indeed,
about the organization’s long-term viability.
While NATO superficially remains an impres-
sive organization, its ability to be an effective
securitymechanism is fading rapidly. There’s a
caustic saying popular in Texas about people
who have an impressive reputation but pos-
sess few real resources: “all hat and no cattle”:
that applies toNATO.There areunmistakable
signs of trouble in several areas: the weakness
and vulnerability of the new members and
prospective new members; clumsy alliance
policies thathave created serious tensionswith
Russia; growing divisions within the alliance
over policy toward Russia; NATO’s anemic
performance inAfghanistan; and thealarming
decline in the military capabilities of the
alliance’s core Europeanmembers.
NATO Expansion:
AddingMilitarily Useless—
and Vulnerable—Members
At the April 2008 NATO summit in
Bucharest, alliance leaders gave a green light
for eventualmembership to twomorenations:
Croatia andAlbania. TheSummitDeclaration
stated: “Today, we have decided to invite
Albania andCroatia tobeginaccession talks to
join our Alliance.We congratulate these coun-
tries on this historic achievement, earned
through years of hardwork anddemonstrated
commitment to our common security and
NATO’s shared values. The accession of these
newmemberswill strengthen security for all in
the Euro-Atlantic area.”3 A third Balkan coun-
try, Macedonia, would have received an invita-
tion if it had not been for an unresolved eso-
teric dispute between that country andNATO
member Greece about using the name
“Macedonia”—which Athens claims belongs
exclusively to a region in Greece.
The proposed addition of Croatia and
Albania represents the third round of enlarge-
ment for the alliance. That decision also high-
lights NATO’s waning security relevance and
increasingly dubious attributes in the post–
ColdWar era. The addition of small countries
with murky political characteristics, trivial
military capabilities, and dicey relations with
neighboring states is a development that is
especially pertinent from the standpoint of
America’s security interests, given this coun-
try’s obligations as the leader of the alliance.
Adding such members does nothing to aug-
ment the vast military power of the United
States or enhance the security of the American
people. All enlargement does is create another
set of potential headaches forWashington.4
NATO was once a serious alliance with a
serious purpose. Throughout the Cold War,
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it prevented the Soviet Union from intimi-
dating or (less likely) attacking democratic
Western Europe—a region of considerable
strategic and economic importance. True, the
United States was always the dominant play-
er in the alliance, but Washington could
count on credible secondary military powers,
most notably Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
and Turkey. That is no longer the case.
Micro Allies
The new members the alliance has admit-
ted since the end of the Cold War are weak
client states that expect the United States to
defend them. That was largely true even of
the first round of expansion that added the
mid-sized countries of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary. It was more evident
in the second round that embraced such tiny
military players as Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia. Such micro allies are
security consumers, not security producers.
From the standpoint of American interests
they are not assets, they are liabilities—and
potentially very dangerous liabilities.
Taking on the obligation to defend the
Baltic countrieswas especially unwise, because
NATO now poses a direct geopolitical chal-
lenge to Russia right on Moscow’s doorstep.
Relations between Russia and its small Baltic
neighbors are testy, to put it mildly. At the
moment, Russiamay be tooweak to challenge
theU.S./NATOsecurity commitment to those
countries, but we cannot be certain that will
always be true.
The endorsementofNATOmembership for
Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance
has nowentered the realmof farce. Themilitary
capabilities of those two countries are minus-
cule. According to the 2009 edition of The
Military Balance, published by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Croatia’smilitary
budget is a mere $962 million, and its military
force consists of 18,600 active-duty personnel.
Albania’s budget is $233million, and its force is
14,295. They will augment Estonia’s $425 mil-
lion and5,300 troops, Latvia’s $513million and
5,187 troops, Lithuania’s $500 million and
8,850 troops, and Slovenia’s $756 million and
7,200 troops. By not offering membership to
Macedonia, though,NATOwillhavetodowith-
out Skopje’s $163 million and 10,890 troops.5
Collectively, those countries spend less on their
militaries inayearthantheUnitedStatesspends
in Iraq in twoweeks.
The NewMembers Are Dangerous as
Well as Useless
Such new allies are notmerely useless; they
are potentially an embarrassment to the
alliance, and possibly a serious danger. When
Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a
visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed
members would help “rejuvenate” NATO and
rededicate the alliance “to the basic and fun-
damental values of freedom and democracy,”
he showed how out of touch with reality U.S
andNATO policy had become.6
Croatia is just a few years removed from the
fascistic regime of FranjoTudjman and contin-
ues to have frosty relations with neighboring
Serbia. Albania is a close ally of the new, pre-
dominantly Albanian state ofKosovo, an entity
whose independencebothSerbiaandRussia (as
well as most other countries) do not recognize
and vehemently oppose. Albania also is notori-
ous for being under the influence of organized
crime. Indeed, the Albanian mafia is legendary
throughout Europe, controlling much of the
gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking.7
Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the
alliance, a policy that the Bush administration
pushed and the Obama administration en-
dorses, would be evenworse than the previous
rounds of expansion. Ukraine’s relationship
with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia’s
relationship, of course, is evenworse than that,
as last summer’s warfare confirmed. Rational
Americans should have breathed a sigh of
relief thatGeorgiawasnot aNATOmember at
the time the conflict erupted.
Proponents of NATO’s enlargement east-
ward sometimes act as though the alliance is
now merely a political honor society. Their
underlying logic is that, because the nations of
Eastern Europe have become capitalist de-
mocracies, they deserve to be members of the
West’smost prominent club. But nearly all the
3
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newermembers of NATO, which are themost
concerned about possible adverse security
developments emanating fromRussia, consid-
er the alliance tobemore than apolitical body.
They are counting on tangible protection
from depredations by their large eastern
neighbor. And, equally important, Moscow
does not view the current incarnation of
NATO asmerely political in nature.
The Georgian conflict should remind us
thatNATO is still officiallymuchmore than a
political club. It remains a military alliance
with extensive obligations—especially for the
United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty proclaims that an attack on one mem-
ber is an attack on all. That means the United
States is obligated to assist in the defense of
everymember—nomatterhowsmall, howmil-
itarily or economically insignificant, or how
strategically exposed that member might be.8
Are NATO’s Security Commitments a
Strategic Bluff?
That comes perilously close to being a risky
strategic bluff. The war between Russia and
Georgia illustrates the hollow nature of
NATO’s ability to protect small, vulnerable
members. True, Georgia was not a member of
the alliance, and therefore, Article 5 did not
apply. But the country was clearly a client—
albeit an informal client—of theUnited States.
U.S. leaders repeatedly hailed Georgian presi-
dent Mikheil Saakashvili as an American
friendandas a symbolofdemocratic reform in
that part of the world. The conventional wis-
dom assumed that Russia would nevermolest
such a client. And the Georgians certainly
seemed to expect assistance when trouble
arose. As New York Times correspondents
Andrew E. Kramer and Ellen Barry reported
from Georgia during the early days of the
fighting,when retreatingGeorgian troopsmet
Western journalists, “they all said the same
thing: Where is the United States? When is
NATO coming?”9 Yet the United States and
the rest ofNATOdid littlemore than fuss and
fume about theRussianmilitary offensive and
offer postwar reconstruction aid to Tbilisi.
The anemic response of both NATO and the
European Union infuriated hardliners in the
West. A Wall Street Journal editorial derisively
described the policy as one of “Stop! Or We’ll
Say Stop Again!”10
Some analysts expressed confidence that, if
Georgia had been a NATO member, Russia
would have been deterred. Columnist George
Will, for example, posed the question: “If
Georgia were in NATO, would NATO now be
at war with Russia? More likely,” he stated,
“Russia would not be in Georgia.”11
Perhaps. But there is reason to be skeptical
about that conclusion. The reality is that if
Washington and its NATO partners endeav-
ored to carry out their commitments under
Article 5 because a fight erupted between
Russia and a small alliance member, they
would risk war with a nuclear-armed adver-
sary. Such a threat may have had reasonable
credibility during the Cold War, when the
stakes involved keeping democratic Europe—a
major economic and strategic asset—outof the
orbit of an aggressive, totalitarian power. The
declared willingness to risk a war with nuclear
implications is far less credible when the casus
belli is merely a dispute between an authori-
tarian Russia and one small neighbor—which
in the case of the Georgian war was a dispute
over the political status of two secessionist
regions in that neighbor.
Notonlymightdeterrence lack credibility in
that situation, basic prudence should dictate
that suchadegreeof risknotbe incurredexcept
in the defense of vital interests. Georgia’s trou-
bles with Russia—and for that matter, the vari-
ousdisputes that other tinynationsonRussia’s
border have with Moscow—do not come close
to meeting that test even for Europe’s major
powers, much less for the United States. It
seemsmore likely than not thatWashington, if
faced with the terrible potential consequences
of confrontingRussiamilitarily over suchmea-
ger stakes,wouldblink.Andif theUnitedStates
didn’t act, the secondary NATO powers cer-
tainlywouldnot. The alliance’s nonresponse to
Russia’s offensive againstGeorgia suggests that
the security expectations ofNATO’s newmem-
bers and prospective members may be wishful
thinking.
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NATO and Russia:
Poking the Bear
A secondmajor problem afflicting NATO
is that various policies pursued since the end
of the Cold War—especially the alliance’s
actions in the Balkans and the expansion of
NATO to include new members on Russia’s
western frontier—have poisoned relations
withMoscow and re-ignited security tensions
in Europe.
Trampling on Russia’s Interests in the
Balkans
In 1995, NATO forces intervened in Bos-
nia’s civil war to undermine the Serbs, Russia’s
long-standing co-religionists and political
allies. Then, in 1999, the United States and its
allies waged an air war against Serbia, ulti-
mately wrenching away its province of Kosovo.
They bypassed the UN Security Council to do
so, thereby evading a Russian veto. Although
Russian political leaders fumed at such treat-
ment, theycoulddo little except issue impotent
complaints. The country was too weak to do
much else, as both its economy and military
were in disarray.12
Western policy regarding Russia’s sensibili-
ties and tangible interests in the Balkans has
not become more adept with the passage of
years. Once again dismissing Moscow’s objec-
tions, the United States and its leading
European allies bypassed the UN Security
Council to grant Kosovo independence in
February 2008. Russian foreign minister
Sergei Lavrov warned that such a step set a
dangerous international precedent thatwould
encourage secessionistmovements around the
world. America and NATO, he said, had
“opened a Pandora’s box.”Ominously, he not-
ed specifically that the Kosovo precedent
would seem to apply to Georgia’s secessionist
regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.13
Six months later, when the Georgian gov-
ernment tried to regain control of South
Ossetia, Russian forces exploited that foolish
move and launched a devastating counterof-
fensive against its southern neighbor. When
those military operations ceased, the Kremlin
promptly recognized the independence of
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At least in
part, Russia’s actions in Georgia appeared to
be payback for the West’s actions regarding
Kosovo.14
NATO Expansion and Disingenuous
Assurances
U.S. and West European officials not only
trampledonMoscow’s long-standing interests
in theBalkans, they tookadvantageofRussia’s
economic and military disarray during the
1990s to establish a dominant position in
Central and Eastern Europe.15 NATO propo-
nents not only preserved amilitary institution
whose primary purpose was to wage the Cold
War struggle against the Soviet Union in
Europe, they expanded the alliance eastward
into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.
That move violated an apparent promise that
the administration of President George H. W.
Bushhadmade toMoscow inexchange for the
Kremlin’s acceptance of Germany’s reunifica-
tion and Germanmembership in NATO.16
The eastward expansion of the alliance has
been accompanied by soothing assurances to
Moscow—assurances that increasingly lack
credibility. Ronald D. Asmus (who would later
serve as a deputy assistant secretary of state in
the Clinton administration) and other promi-
nent NATO experts argued in 1993: “Extend-
ing the alliance eastward should be seen as the
West taking a step toward Russia, rather than
against it.”17 Because NATO is now at least as
much a political body as a military organiza-
tion, so the argument goes, Russia has no rea-
son to fear or oppose its expansion—even to
Russia’s own border.
Some advocates of expansion even argued
that Russia would benefit from enlarging the
alliance to include Central and East European
countries that had been part of the defunct
Soviet-dominatedWarsawPact.TheWashing-ton
Post’s Stephen S. Rosenfeld contended: “By
steadying a disruptive-prone slice of Europe on
a sensitive Russian border, expansion gives
heart and political space to Russia’s liberal
Westernizing party and steals a card from the
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conservative and nationalistic party that is giv-
en to tension and adventure.”18 Western offi-
cials are still assuring the Russians that an
expanded NATO, even one that includes
Ukraine and Georgia, poses no threat whatso-
ever to their country. During aNovember 2008
visit to Estonia, Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates asserted that “Russia has no need to
impedeasovereigncountry’sdesire tomore ful-
ly integratewith theWest.”Such integration,he
stated, “is not a threat to Russia’s security.”19
Yet NATO actions (especially those of the
UnitedStates) belie those assurances. Contrary
to promises given toMoscow,NATOhas from
time to time deployed military personnel and
jet fighter aircraft in the Baltic states. The
United States has also stressed that NATO
must be better prepared to defend those coun-
tries from any possible Russian attack.20
Washington has also struck agreements with
Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy bal-
listic missile defense systems in those coun-
tries. Although these systems are ostensibly
aimed at defending against Iran’s emerging
missile capability,Moscowregards thatdeploy-
ment as a threat to the integrity and credibility
of its own nuclear deterrent. In any case, the
missile defense system is certainly a military
measure, not a gesture one would expect from
amerely political organization.
The first round of expansion in 1998 gave
membership to Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, over the Yeltsin government’s
objections. That expansion of the alliance was
nonprovocative, though, compared to the sec-
ond round in 2004 that incorporated (among
other countries) Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania
—entities that had been part of the Soviet
Union.
Russia’s political elite was furious at such
behavior, and NATO’s actions badly under-
mined democratic, pro-Western political
forces in that country while strengthening
authoritarian nationalist elements. Despite
the pervasive sense of anger andbetrayal, there
was little that Moscow could do at the time
except issue impotent complaints. The coun-
try was simply too weak, both militarily and
economically, to take more serious counter-
measures. But that situationhas changed, and
Moscowhasbegun topushback. Inparticular,
the Kremlin has emphasized that attempts to
grant NATO membership to Ukraine and
Georgia cross a bright red line and will not be
tolerated.
Policy toward Russia
Exposes New Fissures in
the Alliance
Policy towardRussia has creatednoticeable
fissures within NATO. At the NATO summit
in Bucharest in April 2008, opposition from
Germany, France, and other key long-time
members thwarted Washington’s goal of
offering a Membership Action Plan (the first
stage of preparing a country for admission to
NATO) to Georgia and Ukraine. French and
German officials argued that adding those
countries to the alliance would needlessly pro-
voke Russia and further damage the West’s
already tense relationship with Moscow. The
summit declaration offered the vacuous
promise that “NATO’s door will remain open
to European democracies willing and able to
assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership.” In an implicit slap at Russia’s
objections to further enlargement, thedeclara-
tion also emphasized that “decisions on
enlargement are for NATO itself to make.”21
While that languagemayhavebeen a conso-
lation prize for the United States and the East
European proponents of enlargement, the lan-
guage regarding the candidaciesofGeorgia and
Ukraine suggested a victory by the West
European skeptics. The declaration did affirm
that “NATOwelcomesUkraine’s andGeorgia’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations” formembershipand
signaled agreement “that these countries will
become members of NATO.” Instead of offer-
ing a Membership Action Plan, however, the
summit merely pledged to “begin a period of
intensive engagement” to “address the ques-
tions still outstanding pertaining to theirMAP
applications,” and directed the foreign minis-
ters to assess the progress of those countries in
meeting the requirements for membership.22
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Notably, there was no timetable for admission
to the alliance. In terms of the crucial opera-
tional details, the West European critics of
membership forGeorgia andUkraineprevailed
at Bucharest.
Intra-alliance divisions became even more
evident in response to the Russian-Georgian
war in August 2008.23 The Central and East
Europeanmembers ofNATOwere alarmed at
Russia’s willingness to use force against a
small neighbor, and they pressed their alliance
partners to take a hard line towardMoscow.24
As a senior alliance official told the Times of
London, Russia’s near neighbors who are
already in NATO “are the ones leading the
charge to put the Russian threat” back on the
agenda. Because of the Georgian war, “there
areNATOmembers suchasPoland, theCzech
Republic, and the Baltic states” who want the
alliance to concentrate again on “military
structures to deter Russia.”25
Most West European members, though,
favored a far more cautious approach, remind-
ing their colleagues that the West needed
Russia’s cooperation on a variety of issues, in-
cludingattempts to thwart Iran’snuclear ambi-
tions. Germany, France, and other countries
also were aware of Moscow’s ability to exploit
Europe’s dependence on natural gas supplies
originating in Russia for diplomatic and politi-
cal leverage. (Any doubts on that score evapo-
rated in February 2009, when Russia’s quarrel
withUkraine over the pricing of natural gas led
to a virtual shutdownof the pipeline leading to
Central andWestern Europe.)
The West European countries seem even
more reluctant to admitGeorgia andUkraine
to NATO following the armed skirmishes
between Moscow and Tbilisi.26 Poland’s for-
eign minister, Radek Sikorski, a leading con-
tender to become NATO’s next secretary gen-
eral, conceded thatmembership for those two
countries was, at best, a “fairly distant
prospect.” At the moment, he said, there was
simply “no will” within the alliance for such
enlargement.27 A senior U.S. official reached a
similar conclusion, stating “I think it’s fair to
predict there would be no NATO member-
ship offer for some years to come.”28
The response to the Russian-Georgian war
indicated that Washington’s policy preferences
were closer to the hard-line position advocated
by NATO’s newer (East European) members
than they were to the views of America’s tradi-
tional alliance partners.29 But the West Euro-
peangovernments, especially those inGermany
and France, dug in their heels and refused to
endorse confrontational proposals.30 (That
reluctance to embrace strong countermeasures
also created an East-West policy rift within the
European Union, and a testy U.S. response to
the apparent victory by advocates of concilia-
tion toward Russia.)31
In the end, NATO’s response to Russia’s
coercion of Georgia amounted to little more
than feeble diplomatic protests and a tempo-
rary suspension of meetings between NATO
and Kremlin officials.32 Russian leaders open-
ly scorned NATO’s “empty words.”33 West
European leaders did offer one significant
concession to the United States—agreeing to
endorse the deployment of ballistic missile
defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic,
despite Russia’s vehement opposition to such
a system.34 The allies did so even though some
West European leaders were openly skeptical
regarding thewisdomof such a deployment.35
One can anticipate further, and increasing-
ly pointed, disagreements among alliance
members regarding policy toward Russia.
There is little cohesion within NATO about
how to deal with that important and some-
times prickly eastern neighbor. Although there
were some intra-alliance differences even dur-
ing theColdWar, thosedifferences aredwarfed
by the current disagreements.
NATO’s FalteringMission
in Afghanistan
Key policy divisions among alliance mem-
bers and the dubious strategy of adding vul-
nerable, militarily irrelevantmembers are not
the only indications that NATO has lost its
bearings and is becoming irrelevant as a seri-
ous security player. Another indicator is the
fraying alliance mission in Afghanistan.
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Western leaders have repeatedly stated that
Afghanistan is a key test of NATO’s relevance
and effectiveness in the 21st century. If that is
true, the alliance is failing that test.36
Immediately following the terrorist attacks
on 9/11, NATO governments invoked Article
5 for the first time in the history of the
alliance. U.S. leaders welcomed the European
pledges of support, and the U.S.-led military
campaign in Afghanistan soon had a key
NATO component.
Symbolic Military Deployments
But early on, doubts began to arise about
how serious the European allies were about
their military commitments. Indeed, most of
the NATO governments seemed to view their
troop deployments as personnel for humani-
tarian relief and nation-building missions
rather thanforcombatoperations.Themilitary
heavy liftingwas, by and large, left toU.S. forces
and those of Canada, Britain, and a few other
alliance members. In August 2003, NATO for-
mally took command of the International
Security Assistance Force, which the UN
SecurityCouncil hadauthorizedunder apeace-
enforcement mandate. As Cato Institute re-
search fellow Stanley Kober notes, “ISAF has
never seen itself as awar-fighting force.”Rather,
its goal was to “facilitate the reconstruction of
Afghanistan.”37
In fact,with thepartial exceptionofBritish,
Canadian, and Dutch units, most of the
NATO troop contributions amount to little
more than military symbolism. The NATO
governments can argue that they are con-
tributing to theU.S.-ledmission, but in reality
most of the deployments are militarily irrele-
vant. That is true even as overall alliance troop
levels in Afghanistan have gradually climbed.
MostNATOmembershaveplaceda variety
of caveats on the use of their military person-
nel. Some forbid them fromengaging in night
operations (which are inherently more dan-
gerous). Others prohibit their forces from
being deployed in certain areas of the coun-
try—specifically, those areas where significant
combat is taking place and where additional
troopsmight actually prove useful.
Germany is one of the worst offenders in
that regard. Berlin has kept its troops in the
northern regions of Afghanistan, where vir-
tually no fighting is taking place. Despite
Washington’s repeated requests, the German
government has refused to lift that restric-
tion. That might be just as well. A November
2008 German parliamentary report conclud-
ed that the country’s troops in Afghanistan
spent most of their time lounging around
and drinking beer, and that many were now
too fat and out of condition to be of use in
combat operations against the Taliban or al
Qaeda.38
As America’s NATO allies have postured
and dithered in Afghanistan, the mission in
that country has badly frayed. Over the past
three to four years, the Taliban and al Qaeda
have regained strength and launched ever
more lethal attacks against U.S. and Afghan
government forces. Both theBushandObama
administrations have been deeply concerned
about those adverse trends and pressed the
European allies to commit more troops.
The response has been decidedly under-
whelming. Although the French parliament
voted in September 2008 tokeep the country’s
3,500 troops in Afghanistan, Paris has no cur-
rent plans to increase that contingent. French
Defense Minister Hervé Morin stated bluntly
in February 2009 that France has “already
made a considerable effort” toward stabilizing
Afghanistan and that “there’s no question for
the moment of sending additional troops.”39
The Netherlands, which despite its size has
beenoneof themore substantial contributors,
not only refuses to increase its military com-
mitment, it has also announced that it will
begin drawing down its 1,770 troops in 2010.
Germany argues that its military is simply too
stretched to commit more troops beyond the
4,500 already in the country. Typically, Berlin
insists that a larger deployment of combat
troops would be superfluous, since the prima-
ry focus of the Afghan mission should be on
civilian reconstruction.40
European “Freeloading”
The lack of seriousness on the part of key
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NATO members regarding Afghanistan has
irritated even some European officials. In a
January 2009 speech, BritishDefense Secretary
John Hutton blasted European governments
for failing tobear their fair share of theburden.
“Freeloading on the back ofU.S. security is not
an option if wewish to be equal partners in the
transatlantic alliance,” he warned. “Anyone
who wants to benefit from collective security
must be prepared to share the ultimate price.”
Hutton also had an implicit rebuke for
Germany and other allies who seemed to
believe thathumanitarian andnation-building
tasks were an adequate substitute for combat
responsibilities. “It isn’t goodenough toalways
look to theU.S. for political, financial, andmil-
itary cover. And this imbalance will not be
addressed by parceling up NATO tasks—the
‘hard’ military ones for the U.S. and a few oth-
ers and the ‘soft’ diplomatic ones for the
majority of Europeans.”41
That foot dragging also drew the fire of
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer. “I am frankly concerned when I hear
the United States is planning a major com-
mitment for Afghanistan, but other allies are
ruling out doing more.” A prominent reason
for his discontent echoed Hutton’s concerns:
“That is not good for the political balance of
this mission. That is not good for the balance
inside theNorth Atlantic alliance.”Hewarned
that the failure of key European members to
do more in Afghanistan “makes calls for
Europe’s voice to beheard inWashington abit
more hollow than they should be.”42 In other
words, the Secretary General feared that U.S.
leaders may not take their European partners,
or perhaps even the alliance itself, seriously in
the future.
But the reluctance of the other NATO
members to ramp up their military commit-
ment in Afghanistan is hardly surprising,
because the European publics seem strongly
opposed to sending more troops. A January
2009 public opinion survey conducted by the
Financial Times found solid majorities against
additional troop commitments. Sixty percent
of German respondents took that position,
as did 53 percent in both France and Italy.
Even in Great Britain, Washington’s closest
ally and the country with the second largest
military presence in Afghanistan, 57 percent
of those surveyed were hostile to sending
additional forces.43
Such attitudes stand inmarked contrast to
public opinion in the United States, where
strong support remains for pressing the cam-
paign against theTaliban and al-Qaeda. Policy
regarding Afghanistan, and seemingly Wash-
ington’s entire “war on terror,” is another
instance in which there are major fissures
developing in the alliance.
The ErodingMilitary
Capabilities of theMajor
European Allies
NATO’s feckless military performance in
Afghanistan highlights a broader problem.
Not only are most of the alliance’s newer
members marginal military players at best,
even the traditional major European allies
have allowed their defense establishments to
decay. The gap between America’s military
capabilities and those of its European part-
ners has grown to be a chasm. U.S. military
leaders warn that significant joint operations
with other NATO members are increasingly
difficult, and may soon become impossible.
In other words, the forces of the other
alliance members are becoming obsolete and
ineffective.
Spending and Force Levels Are Plunging
That is not surprising. With the partial
exceptions of Britain and France, the military
budgets—to say nothing of crucial spending
on forcemodernization—of theprincipalWest
European powers have been in virtual free fall
since the end of the Cold War. The spending
and force levels of three key members of
NATO—Germany, Italy, and Spain—illustrate
the problem. Spain devoted 1.85 percent of its
grossdomesticproduct todefense in1989and
deployed more than 274,000 troops and 244
combat aircraft. By 2008, those figures were
down to 0.73 percent of GDP, fewer than
9
The gap between
America’s
military capabili-
ties and those of
its European
partners has
grown to be a
chasm.
361505_PA635_1stClassIndicia:361505_PA635_1stClassIndicia  3/12/2009  9:39 AM  Page 9
150,000 troops, and 197 aircraft. The plunge
in spending and military capabilities for Italy
has been equally dramatic. In 1989, the per-
centageofGDPspenton themilitarywas1.94,
and the country had nearly 390,000 troops
and 425 combat aircraft. In 2008, the figures
were 0.96percent, 185,000 troops, and266air-
craft.44
Berlin’s precipitous decline in military
spending and force levels is perhaps the most
disheartening. During the Cold War, West
Germany was the front-line state and a crucial
military partner in the containment of the
USSR. Berlin’s military spending in 1989 was
2.27percent ofGDP, and theBundeswehrhad
469,000 active-duty military personnel and
621 combat aircraft. By 2008, spending had
shrunk to 1.19 percent ofGDP, and the active-
duty force was down to fewer than 245,000
troops and 310 combat aircraft. Germany’s
navy had also shrunk by nearly 50 percent,
declining from 208 vessels to 111.45
The slippage in Britain and France is also
worrisome, although spending levels were
higher to begin with and remain atmarginal-
ly more respectable levels than do those of
the other three countries. Yet, Paris, which
devoted amodest 2.98 percent of GDP to the
military in 1989 and fielded 461,000 troops
and 697 combat aircraft, is now spending
only 1.54 percent, while force levels consist of
barely 249,000 troops and 351 aircraft.46 For
Britain, the figures in 1989 were 3.98 percent
of GDP, 306,000 troops, and 583 aircraft. In
2008, the figures were 2.33 percent, fewer
than 161,000 troops, and only 356 aircraft.
Even the vaunted British navy had shrunk
from 206 vessels to 109.47
Only four European members have met
even the meager goal alliance leaders set sever-
al years ago to have all NATO countries spend
at least twopercentofGDPondefense.By con-
trast, U.S. military spending (including the
expenditures for the missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan) is nearly five percent of GDP.
Since the American economy is far larger than
any of the European countries, five percent of
GDPmeans thatWashington’smilitary spend-
ing utterly dwarfs the spending of its allies.
But the raw numbers do not fully convey
the depth of the problem. Not only are the
European countries spending less and reduc-
ing the number of such crucial weapons plat-
forms as ships and planes, but the efforts to
modernize their forces have been modest, at
best. Thus, in many cases, key weapons sys-
tems are getting older as well as shrinking in
quantity. The European military component
of NATO threatens to become a force that is
antiquated as well as too small.
In short, the principal European members
ofNATOhave gone fromcountries that some-
whatunderinvested indefenseduring theCold
War tocountrieswhosedefense spending levels
now fail tomeet even the straight-face test. It is
no wonder that U.S. military leaders no longer
consider most of the allies to be credible part-
ners for joint war-fighting scenarios. In his
January speech, John Hutton conceded that
NATO’s ineffectiveness in Afghanistan is at
least partly the result of a “legacy of underin-
vestment by some Europeanmember states in
their armed forces.”48
U.S. policymakers have been worried about
the degradation in Europeanmilitary capabili-
ties for some time. As early as the Persian Gulf
War in 1991, many European countries had
trouble assembling enough planes to airlift
their forces to the region.49 The problems
became far more apparent during the 78-day
air war against Serbia over the Kosovo crisis in
1999. The gap in capabilities was so great that
the United States ended up not only flying the
vast majority of combat missions, but also the
surveillance and refueling missions as well.
Washington also had to provide nearly all the
intelligence functionsandthebulkof the logis-
tics for the operation. Noting that unsatisfac-
tory situation at a meeting of NATO defense
ministers the following year, Secretary of
Defense William Cohen pressed the European
allies to move faster to close the gap in both
spending and capabilities.50
Instead of the gap closing, it grew wider
over the next two years. Secretary of State
Colin Powell admonished his NATO counter-
parts in May 2002 against the creation of a
“two-speed” alliance in which the United
10
The European
military
component of
NATO threatens
to become a force
that is antiquated
as well as too
small.
361505_PA635_1stClassIndicia:361505_PA635_1stClassIndicia  3/12/2009  9:39 AM  Page 10
States takes care of an immediate crisis with
the application of overwhelming high-tech
military power while the other members are
largely reduced to being bystanders.51 A
month earlier, U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Nicholas Burns stressed a similar theme.
“Without dramatic action to close the capabil-
ities gap, we face the real prospect of a two-
tiered alliance,” Burns warned. The alliance
could become “so unbalanced that wemay no
longer have the ability to fight together in the
future.”52
Matters have grown considerably worse
since Powell and Burns spoke in 2002. Yet
even then, the signs of European security free
riding were evident. Nine of the alliance’s
European members were already spending
less than 2 percent of GDP on defense, with
Germany’s anemic 1.4 percent especially wor-
risome.53 And the cuts in force structure and
weapon systems were already proceeding at a
brisk rate. The levels in 2002, though, might
be considered robust compared to the situa-
tion today.
The Burden-Sharing Illusion
Some American policy experts insist that
only by spending even more than the vast
sums it already spends on the military will
Washington have enough meaningful influ-
ence to get the European countries to increase
their paltry efforts. Robert Kagan, a senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, denounces the possibility
that the Obama administration might slow
the surge in U.S. military spending that has
taken place since 9/11. Such a move, he con-
tends, “would make it harder to press allies to
do more. The Obama administration rightly
plans to encourage European allies to increase
defense capabilities so they canmore equitably
share theburdenofglobal commitments.This
will be a tough sell if the United States is cut-
ting its own defense budget.”54
The notion that the Europeanmembers of
NATO are interested in boosting their anemic
militarybudgets—especially tohelp theUnited
States handle global burdens, most of which
would be outside Europe—is naive.55
Moreover,Kagan’s argument is a classic caseof
the triumph of hope over experience.
Washington has been encouraging (indeed,
often badgering or even begging) the Euro-
peanallies to engage ingreaterburden-sharing
since NATO’s inception in 1949—without
much success.56 That was true even during the
heightof theColdWarwhen theUnitedStates
and the European powers faced a dangerous
common adversary, the Soviet Union. Alan
Tonelson, a senior fellow at the U.S. Business
and Industry Council Education Foundation
and a long-time analyst of NATO issues, pro-
vides a depressing summary of Washington’s
frustrations:
America’s Cold War burden-sharing
efforts failed for many reasons. But the
main explanation is that U.S. leaders
never gave the Europeans sufficient
incentive to assume greater military
responsibilities. The incentive was lack-
ing, in turn, because Washington never
believed it could afford to walk away
from NATO, or even reduce its role, if
the allies stood firm.Worse, U.S. leaders
repeatedly telegraphed that message to
the Europeans—often in the midst of
burden-sharing controversies.57
Thathistorical record suggests thatKagan’s
thesis turns the role of incentives on its head.
The more likely scenario is that if the United
States continues to overspend on the military
and implicitly subsidize the security of the
European allies, they will be perfectly content
to continue that arrangement. Indeed, that is
what theyhavedone fornearly sixdecades.The
current economic circumstances may actually
increase the tendency to free ride. Given the
scope of the European safety nets, domestic
political constituencies are likely to pressure
their governments to divert even more rev-
enues to welfare programs. There certainly will
be few constituencies clamoring to boost mili-
tary spending—especially when the United
States is obligingly taking care of the conti-
nent’s security needs, with American taxpayers
footing the bill.
11
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If Washington wants to maximize the
prospects that the NATO members will
increase their military spending, U.S. officials
need to adopt the opposite course: significant-
ly cut spending and implement a phasedwith-
drawal of American troops fromEurope. That
alters the incentive structure. Especially with
Russia beginning to flex itsmuscles, prudence
would dictate that the European powers take
security issues more seriously and create at
least respectable military capabilities as basic
insurance. To do otherwise would be to risk
being vulnerable to escalating pressure from
Moscow on a variety of issues.
Kagan himself implicitly conceded the role
of incentives in 2003, noting that the
Europeans “could easily spend twice as much
as they are currently spending on defense if
they believed it was necessary to do so.”58 He
viewed with skepticism the European argu-
ments that there are certain “structural reali-
ties” in their national budgets, “built-in limi-
tations to any increases in defense spending.”
If Europe were about to be invaded, Kagan
asked, “would its politicians insist thatdefense
budgets could not be raised because this
would violate the terms of the EU’s growth
and stability pact? IfGermans truly felt threat-
ened, would they insist nevertheless that their
social welfare programs be left untouched?”59
But threat perception is only one compo-
nent of the incentive picture. Equally impor-
tant is whether the countries in question can
free ride on an outside protector, or whether
they must instead rely on their own military
resources for protection. It is that calculation
that existing U.S. defense policy, to say noth-
ing of the smothering policy that Kagan and
other supporters of U.S. hegemony advocate,
distorts in an especially corrosive fashion.
Washington’s oversized role in NATO short-
circuits a crucial incentive for the European
powers to do more for their own defense.
NATO in Its Dotage
All of these developments—the growing
policy divisions (especially with regard to
Russia), the addition of small, weak, and vul-
nerable new members, the alliance’s inept
performance in Afghanistan, and the erosion
of the military capabilities of Washington’s
traditional European partners—confirm that
NATO is fast becoming a parody of its for-
mer self. It is increasingly little more than a
political fraternity rather than a credible
security alliance. That is sad, because the
alliance was once a serious and capable mili-
tary association with an important purpose.
That is no longer the case, and there is lit-
tle prospect that the process of decay can be
reversed. Today’sNATO is a hollow shell. The
outward appearance is one of an impressive
organization—with an abundance of perks
for the military brass of member states and a
generator of conferences, papers, and studies
for a vast network of policymakers and out-
side experts who benefit from the perpetua-
tion of its venerable bureaucracy. But as
Gertrude Stein famously said of Oakland,
“there is no there, there.” NATO is no longer
an effective or, inmost instances, even a cred-
ible security alliance. Certainly, NATO in its
current form does not advance the security
and well-being of the American republic. It is
time to terminate this increasingly dysfunc-
tional alliance—or at the very least extricate
the United States from it.
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